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Rescuing the Balance?
An Assessment of Canada’s Proposal to Limit
ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement 
Scott Nesbitt†
suggests that the underlying rationale and potentialIntroduction 
impact of Canada’s proposed reforms in this area war-
rant careful assessment. The issue of ISP liability raisesn June 22, 2001, the Government of Canada issued
important questions regarding not only the ability ofO its Framework for Copyright Reform1 and sig-
copyright law to sensibly adapt to new technologies, butnalled that Phase III of its amendments to the Copyright
also more introspective questions about the fundamentalAct2 would attempt to modernize the legislative scheme
purpose of intellectual property regimes generally. Exam-to meet the complexities of the digital age. As then Min-
ination of the legal issues raised by the realities of digi-ister of Industry Brian Tobin indicated, the impulse for
tization suggests that, at least from the perspective ofreform stems not only from the desire to adequately
copyright owners and ISPs, the proposed amendments toprotect the creative works of artists, but also from the
limit the liability of ISPs are both a necessary and appro-recognition that an effective copyright regime promises
priate response to the technical exigencies of enforcingbroader social and economic benefits:
copyright on the Internet. In this respect, proposed limi-Canada needs a copyright framework that continuously
tations on ISP liability clarify legal uncertainty con-adapts to a fast-changing digital environment. The Copy-
right Act is an important lever to promote innovation, entre- cerning liability for online copyright infringement. In
preneurship and success in the new economy . . . . A world- displaying this sensitivity to technology, the government
class copyright regime can help us grow the Internet, elec- might be commended for bringing the Copyright Act uptronic commerce and e-learning in Canada. 3
to digital speed. However, closer examination of the pro-
Although the federal government suggests that there posals and consideration of their possible consequences
is a ‘‘renewed sense of urgency regarding reform of the suggests that support for these reforms must be tem-
Copyright Act’’ 4 and such legislation has already been pered. Although the contemplated ISP liability regime
passed in other jurisdictions — most notably the United may help the Copyright Act balance the interests of ISPs
States5 and the European Union6 — Canada is taking a and content providers, it nonetheless risks extending
relatively slow and cautious approach to reform. 7 excessive enforcement powers to rights holders. Ironi-
Released together with the Framework for Copyright cally, in an atmosphere where many presume that the
Reform, the government’s Consultation Paper on Digital challenge which new technologies present to copyright
Copyright Issues 8 outlines proposed changes to the is how to ensure sufficient rights protection for owners,
statute and solicits feedback from interested stake- the proposed reforms may go too far in shifting the
holders. 9 This document proposes four major amend- balance in favour of protecting rights holders and away
ments. The first of these would introduce a ‘‘making from promoting the public interest.
available’’ right to confirm that copyright holders do in
fact have an exclusive right to post material on the This paper attempts both to explain the technolog-
Internet. 10 The remaining three proposals deal with how ical and legal imperatives pressing Canada to address the
copyright will be enforced and infringement discour- issue of ISP liability in reforms to the Copyright Act and
aged in the digital environment. These include provi- to raise some concerns about the impact of the govern-
sions that would protect rights management information ment’s proposed amendments in this area. The basic
embedded in digital works, 11 restrict circumvention of elements of copyright law, the impact of digital tech-
technological measures designed to safeguard copyright nology on copyright and the policy arguments sur-
material, 12 and, perhaps most importantly, limit the lia- rounding ISP liability are briefly discussed to set the
bility of Internet service providers (ISPs). 13 context for judicial treatment of and legislative action on
The controversy that has engulfed legislative this issue. Next, the paper focuses on the development of
amendments to limit ISP liability in other jurisdictions American jurisprudence with respect to limitation of ISP


































































116 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
liability for third party copyright infringement, 14 ment to knowingly distribute an infringing work for the
including examination of the pre-existing legal uncer- purposes of trade or to such an extent that it prejudi-
tainty in this area as well as the clarification offered in cially affects the owner of the copyright, to sell or rent an
the DMCA. The position in Canadian law is then infringing work, or to import an infringing work into
assessed, highlighting in particular how proposed Canada for sale or hire. 24 The Act provides several ‘‘fair
amendments to the Copyright Act help resolve the legal dealing’’ exemptions to liability for infringement,
questions surrounding ISP liability that remain unan- including the reproduction of works for private study or
swered after the Copyright Board’s Tariff 22 decision research, criticism, review and newspaper summary. 25
and its subsequent judicial review by the Federal Court Where an alleged infringer fails to bring its activities
of Appeal. 15 Theoretical justifications of copyright law within one of these exemptions, rights holders can apply
are considered as a measure against which to assess for damages, injunctions, accounting of profits and
whether the effects of the proposed new enforcement delivery of infringing works. 26 Criminal sanctions may
regime accord with the fundamental purposes of copy- also be imposed against those who knowingly distribute,
right law. The paper concludes that, although the pro- import or trade in infringing works. 27
posed amendments limiting ISP liability are an adequate
first step in helping copyright confront new technologies,
they must be fine-tuned in order to better protect the Digital Challenges 
public interest before any legislation is passed.
As the rights of owners are fixed by statute, new
technological developments inevitably challenge pre-
existing legal concepts of copyright and the traditionalBackground to Reform 
mechanisms used to enforce it. As Professor Ginsburg
efore launching into an analysis of the intricacies of explains, ‘‘The setting of the copyright balance is notB the legal rationale for copyright reform, it is appro- immutable; rather, each significant technological pro-
priate to first briefly outline the basic nature of copyright gress may alter the balance of control between authors
law, the challenges digital technology presents, and the and users, in turn eventually prompting a new legal cali-
reasons why ISPs have become the focus of many bration’’. 28 Indeed, the history of copyright law reflects
debates about how to police online copyright infringe- an almost continuous trend of reaction to technology
ment. and recalibration of the law. The advent of the player
piano, camera, radio, television, photocopier, audio tape
recorder and video cassette recorder have all presentedThe Statutory Creature that is Copyright 
new challenges to copyright and provoked a rethinkingCopyright law is a creature of statute; the only rights
of the law.29available to copyright holders are those outlined in the
legislation. 16 First passed in Canada in 1924, the Copy- Despite this history of adaptation, there is nonethe-
right Act grants specified protections to the creators of less a sense that the combined force of digital technology
original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. 17 In and the Internet present a previously unparalleled threat
most circumstances, the term of the copyright extends to the continued vitality of copyright law. The ability to
for the life of the creator plus fifty years. 18 Although the convert works based in text, images, video and sound to
author or creator is the first owner of the copyright in a digital format has dramatically increased the ability to
work, 19 he or she can license or assign the rights available store, manipulate and distribute such material. 30 In addi-
under the Act either in whole or in part. 20 The Act tion, copying becomes infinitely easier — with the fur-
provides copyright holders with an exclusive ‘‘bundle of ther advantage that the quality of each digital reproduc-
rights’’ that are cumulative and distinct from any tan- tion is virtually indistinguishable from the original. And,
gible right in the material work itself. 21 These are listed of course, the growth of the Internet has only accentu-
in section 3(1) and include the sole right to: produce or ated the ease and speed with which such works can be
reproduce a work or any substantial part thereof; per- located, accessed and shared around the globe. 31 As
form the work in public; translate a work; convert a numerous commentators have noted, these technolog-
work from one medium to another; and communicate ical developments render copyright works extremely vul-
the work to the public by telecommunication. The rights nerable to piracy and unauthorized reproduction; no
holder also has the right to authorize anyone else to do longer do such infringements depend upon the posses-
any of the activities protected under the other enumer- sion of a tangible product or rely on more easily super-
ated rights. In addition, the original author retains the vised physical modes of distribution. 32 Perhaps even
moral rights in a work for the duration of the term of more alarmingly, the nature of copyright infringement is
protection. 22 shifting from commercial piracy operations to pervasive
Direct copyright infringement occurs whenever a individual copying for private purposes. 33 Not only does
person, without the consent of the copyright holder, this disperse the locus of control through which an
does anything that the owner has the exclusive right to owner might protect a work, but it also risks sanctioning

































































ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement 117
diate copying and sharing of information for non-com- their subscribers and therefore argue that ISPs are best
mercial purposes as a fundamental right’’. 34 situated to prevent or pay for infringement. 42 Alterna-
tively, theories of loss-spreading are invoked to justify ISPCreators and copyright industries are understand-
liability because, even if they do not have direct controlably concerned about the scale of infringement that dig-
over or derive direct financial benefit from subscribers’ital technology and the Internet make possible. One
infringements, ISPs nonetheless provide the means forobserver suggests that copying of protected works on the
and reap profits from the consumer appeal of such activi-Internet has reached ‘‘epidemic proportions’’ and esti-
ties. 43 Frequently, these arguments mesh together, as ismates worldwide annual losses to the software industry
evident in SOCAN’s reply to the Consultation Paper :alone at $13 billion. 35 Here in Canada, the Canadian
Recording Industry Association (CRIA) attributes a 10%
ISPs are the one place that is currently regulated by Cana-drop in sales of recorded works between 2000 and 2001 dian law, have a large capital investment and have a physical
to the proliferation of Internet piracy. 36 However, in connection to everyone of their customers. No payment, no
access to the Internet for an individual user. . . . ISP’s sub-addition to this economic self-interest, there is a broader
scriber base is driven by the free content that is available onpublic concern that without adequate copyright protec-
the Internet. The ISPs have been the general beneficiary oftion, creators will simply refuse to make their works
the current situation which is very unfair to rights holders.available in the digital environment. 37 Any such disin- Rights holders are not getting paid, ISPs are. This needs to
centive threatens to empty the Internet of its substantive be addressed. 44
content and thus to diminish its technological promise
of increased global access to a wider diversity of informa- From a somewhat less adversarial perspective, com-
tion: mentators also suggest that imposing liability on ISPs not
only will help to compensate rights holders and spreadUnless they can become author-friendly, digital media may
remain just that: media, without content . . . . If all kinds of the costs of infringement, but also engage ISPs in the task
works of authorship, particularly those of intense creativity of deterring subscriber infringement. 45
and imagination are to embark willingly on the cyber-road,
then authors require some assurance that the journey will
In response to these arguments for liability, ISPs andnot turn into a hijacking. 38
others assert that the technical reality of Internet trans-The result of inadequate copyright protection then, missions makes any attempt to impose liability for copy-is not only a diminution of creative content on the right infringement upon ISPs unfair and unreasonable.Internet, but also a lack of investment in technology that Admittedly, ISPs are usually commercial operations thatmay ultimately hurt society as a whole. 39 supply and operate the equipment and software required
Of course, the very same facets of digital technology to provide a subscriber with Internet access. They also
and the Internet that spark so much trepidation among make arrangements with other ISPs to facilitate access to
copyright holders — particularly the speed and ease of the ‘‘network of networks’’ that is the Internet and
distributing works — also promise great benefits if the operate routers and other equipment to forward infor-
copyright regime can be effectively extended to this new mation to designated addresses. 46 In these transmission
environment. As a result, several alternatives have been and networking tasks, ISPs inevitably make temporary
forwarded to enhance the ability of copyright owners to digital copies of all material that passes through their
enforce their rights. One of the most commonly posited systems. But, as the Canadian Association of Internet
options is to impose some form of liability on ISPs for Providers points out, ‘‘ISPs do not select the content that
the online infringement of their subscribers. is transmitted over their facilities; rather, they merely
transmit the content that has been selected by others’’. 47
And, such arguments continue, neither the equipmentISPs: An Appropriate Target for Liability? nor the connections ISPs supply enable them to effec-
Faced with the prospect of potentially massive copy- tively monitor the endless stream of packeted informa-
right infringement in the online environment, copyright tion that flows through their facilities. It is simply tech-
owners and government regulators have turned to ISPs nologically infeasible for ISPs to screen out the infringing
as potential targets for liability. 40 No doubt this is in part transmissions of subscribers: ‘‘Given the volumes of
because it is so difficult for copyright owners to track information, reviewing the content of the billions of tril-
diffuse and anonymous individual private infringers; lions of bits of information that are transmitted over
and, no doubt that this is also in part because such systems of information providers, it is operationally
individuals are frequently impecunious and therefore impossible for such persons to review and monitor the
not worth prosecuting. These constraints, contrasted information not originated by them’’. 48 If this is true of
with the relative ease with which ISPs can be identified transmissions that pass through their systems, Skelton
and their comparably ‘‘deep-pockets’’, clearly make ISPs a convincingly argues that it is equally as technically and
preferred defendant for copyright infringement actions. 41 economically unrealistic to expect ISPs to supervise the
Having thus found a more rewarding avenue of enforce- extensive and ever-changing content they may host for
ment, copyright owners often assume that ISPs have the subscribers in the form of Web pages or temporarily

































































118 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
may have been unaware of the copyright infringement.These competing policy arguments, coupled with
Intent to infringe is not needed to find copyright infringe-the technical complexity and variability of the relation-
ment. Intent or knowledge is not an element of infringe-ships between ISPs and their subscribers, have caused ment, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
significant legal difficulty in resolving the issue of ISP infringement. 55
liability for online copyright infringement. This is true of Indeed, the finding of liability for the BBS operator
attempts to determine whether ISPs can be held liable was even more disconcerting from the perspective of
because of either their own direct actions or those of ISPs given that as soon as Frena became aware of the
their subscribers. As the analysis of the American and infringing material he removed it and monitored future
Canadian caselaw below suggests, the difficulty the subscriber uploads to prevent Playboy’s pictures from
courts have encountered in resolving this area of the law being posted.
justifies and warrants the proposed amendments to the
The finding that passive copying on a BBS made theCopyright Act.
operator liable for direct infringement was clearly prob-
lematic in that it failed to recognize that all such
intermediaries must make a temporary copy of a fileThe American Position: From before any transmission. Such an approach to liability
Judicial Uncertainty to the DMCA necessarily leads to almost unlimited ISP liability for the
transmissions and postings of not only its own sub-lthough there are important distinctions between scribers, but also those of any third party message orA American and Canadian copyright law, reviewing posting transmitted through its system. As Yen notes, thehow the legal approach to ISP liability developed in Court’s failure to apply a knowledge requirement forAmerican jurisprudence nonetheless serves as a useful direct infringement within the digital environmentstarting point for understanding how these issues might results in ‘‘tortured reasoning’’ that ignores technical real-be settled in Canada. 50 Brief examination of the relevant ities. 56 This critique notwithstanding, the Northern Dis-cases indicates that, although initial judicial treatment of trict Court of California followed the Frena decision onethe subject applied copyright law in a rigid manner year later. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA57 thelargely insensitive to the realities of new technologies, plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction on theAmerican courts eventually adopted a more flexible grounds that the defendant’s mere creation and opera-approach to copyright infringement that substantially tion of a BBS was sufficient to establish direct liability forlimited the liability of ISPs. Nonetheless, lingering uncer- infringement where copyrighted material appeared ontainty as to the state of the law and resulting fear that this its system. The Clinton administration’s Informationwould inhibit ISP investment in network technology Infrastructure Task Force’s recommendation that serviceeventually compelled legislative reform.51 The DMCA providers should be found liable for copyright infringe-now offers a comprehensive codification of the rules ment only exacerbated the concern of ISPs. 58 The Taskgoverning ISP liability. Force largely accepted the loss-spreading arguments for
such an approach, indicating that since ISPs are for-profit
Frena: Root of ISP concern businesses, finding liability to some extent was reason-
able and would help compensate rights owners forThe first U.S. case involving a service intermediary
online infringement. Confronted with these judicialin a claim for online copyright infringement adopted a
decisions and policy directions, there appeared to be astrict approach to liability that could have had troubling
high risk that ISPs would be liable for infringing activi-results for all ISPs. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 52
ties beyond their technical means of control.the defendant operated a BBS that stored unauthorized
copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted pictures and made
these available to customers who accessed the BBS via
Netcom and after: Soothing ISP fears? telephone modem. Schlesinger D.J. held that Frena
In the Netcom59 decision, the Court devoted signifi-infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive right of public distribu-
cantly more attention to the technological issues under-tion because he operated a product that contained unau-
lying the question of ISP liability for online copyrightthorized copies of the works and allowed them to be
infringement. Consequently, it reached a result thattransmitted from one place to another. 53 In addition,
helped to alleviate, at least in part, the concerns that grewFrena infringed Playboy’s right to public display, as
out of Frena. In this case, the plaintiff RTC held themerely storing pictures that were accessible to paying
copyright in certain published and unpublished works ofcustomers constituted a ‘‘display in public’’. 54 Such find-
L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church ofings caused some alarm for ISPs given that the Court
Scientology. RTC claimed that the defendant Erlich, aaccepted that Frena himself did not post any of the
former member of the Church, posted works to ainfringing photographs and that any copies on the BBS
newsgroup critical of the Church and thereby infringedwere made automatically and without Frena’s knowl-
its rights. Erlich posted the material through a BBS oper-edge:
ated by the defendant Klemesrud, who in turn made theThere is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringe-

































































ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement 119
connection with Netcom, one of the largest American and tenant cases: while a landlord who increases a
ISPs at the time. Erlich would post material to the tenant’s rent in proportion to the tenant’s infringing sales
newsgroup and transmit it to the BBS by dialling directly might be vicariously liable, a landlord who simply
into Klemesrud’s computer. From here, the files would charges a regular monthly rent without regard to the
then be automatically copied from Klemesrud’s com- tenant’s activities is not. Netcom, the Court held, in
puter onto the Netcom server where they could then be charging a flat monthly access fee, resembles the latter
accessed over the Internet. So, Netcom was only actually and could not be said to have a direct financial interest
tangentially related to Erlich; Klemesrud was actually the in the infringement. 66 However, despite this discussion,
Netcom subscriber. The Court considered three argu- the judge did not entirely foreclose the possibility that in
ments with respect to Netcom’s infringement: first, that some circumstances an ISP could be liable for vicarious
it was directly liable because it owned equipment that infringement. 67 Ultimately, the plaintiffs in this case
made, stored, and transmitted copies of copyrighted failed to establish direct financial benefit as a fact, thus
material (as did the BBS operator in Frena); second, that leaving this issue open for future debate, especially given
Netcom’s relationship with Erlich was sufficiently close that the relationship between Erlich and Netcom was in
to result in vicarious infringement; and third, that this case an indirect one.
Netcom knowingly provided service to an infringing Third and finally, the Court considered whether
subscriber (Klemesrud) and was therefore liable for con- Netcom, even if not directly or vicariously liable for
tributory infringement. 60 infringement, might have committed contributory
On the first issue of direct liability, Whyte D.J. infringement. This is a judicially developed doctrine in
emphatically rejected the strict liability approach to U.S. copyright law that applies where a defendant ‘‘with
infringement that the Court adopted in Frena. Even knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
though infringement of the right to reproduce the work materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
is usually treated as a strict liability offence, the Court another’’. 68 Here, the Court refused to grant Netcom’s
held that ‘‘there should still be some element of volition claim for summary judgment on the contributory
or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system infringement issue because it was factually unclear
is merely used to create a copy by a third party’’. 61 Exhib- whether Netcom knew or should reasonably have
iting a greater understanding of the technology of the known that Erlich had infringed the plaintiff’s copy-
Internet and the function of ISPs, Whyte D.J. noted that right. 69 Evidence suggested that RTC forwarded a notice
the argument for finding direct infringement by Netcom to Netcom requesting it to block access to Erlich’s mate-
would, carried to its natural extreme, result in unreason- rial but the notice itself was not presented to the Court.
able liability for ISPs for all Internet transmissions. This Whyte D.J. was prepared to accept that if the contents of
would be inconsistent with the technical feasibility of the notice were sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘knowledge’’
screening out infringing bits of data that might be trans- requirement, Netcom’s failure to block Erlich’s messages
mitted through an ISP’s system.62 In addition to dis- from reaching the Internet would amount to ‘‘substan-
missing the claim for direct infringement of the repro- tive participation’’ in infringement of the plaintiff’s distri-
duction right, the Court also dismissed claims against bution right and justify a finding of contributory
Netcom for infringement of the rights to distribute and infringement. 70 In considering the form of notice that an
display the works to the public that were successful in owner would have to send to bring subscriber informa-
Frena. An ISP that merely stores and passes along tion within the ISP’s ‘‘knowledge’’, the court suggested
messages — acting as a ‘‘passive conduit’’ — could not be that it must contain more than ‘‘a mere unsupported
considered to have caused the works to be publicly dis- allegation’’ but need not be ‘‘unequivocal proof’’ of
tributed or displayed. 63 infringement. An ISP could, however, claim lack of rea-
sonable knowledge if its subscriber could show thatUnder American copyright law, a party can be held
there was ‘‘at least a colourable claim of fair use’’. 71vicariously liable for the actions of a primary infringer if
it has both a right and ability to control the infringer’s In limiting the liability of ISPs acting as ‘‘mere con-
acts and a direct financial interest in the exploitation of duits’’ for both direct and vicarious infringement, the
the copyrighted materials. 64 As Netcom reserved the Netcom decision presented a more technologically
right to disable subscriber access as part of its terms and sound approach that suggested copyright should not be
conditions and evidence showed that it had done so in inflexibly applied to the Internet. However, the lack of
the past, the Court found that the first control element evidence before the Court on contributory infringement
for vicarious infringement was satisfied. 65 However, RTC left open major questions about the liability and obliga-
failed to prove that Erlich’s infringements enhanced the tions of ISPs once notified or aware of a subscriber’s
value of Netcom’s services or attracted it new sub- infringing activity. And while subsequent cases did not
scribers. Despite the fact that Netcom advertised itself as upset the Netcom position on direct and vicarious
providing easy, regulation-free Internet access, the Court infringement of ISPs, they did little to clarify the issue of
was not prepared to presume that it had a direct finan- contributory infringement. For example, in a summary
cial interest in the infringing activities of its subscribers. judgment application, the Northern District Court of
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for direct and vicarious liability against an ISP that vides Web page hosting for subscribers); 82 or, (4) supplies
hosted a subscriber’s Web site containing infringing information location tools (i.e., links or directories) that
material, but allowed the contributory infringement might infringe. 83 ISPs can only benefit from the second
issue to proceed because of a lack of evidence regarding and third exemptions if it: does not have actual or con-
the notice and knowledge requirements. 72 And, although structive knowledge of the infringing activities; does not
at the trial of the above-mentioned MAPHIA case the receive a direct financial benefit from the infringing
Court rejected the preliminary finding that the defen- activity; and, upon obtaining knowledge or notice which
dant directly infringed merely by operating a BBS system makes infringing activities apparent, ‘‘responds expedi-
that contained infringing material, it nonetheless found tiously’’ to remove or disable access to the infringing
that a BBS operator that expressly encouraged sub- material. 84
scribers to upload infringing copies of video games was a While these provisions essentially codify the
contributory infringer. 73 Similarly, BBS operators that Netcom approach to ISP liability, the DMCA clarifies the
actually posted infringing material themselves and pro- uncertainties regarding notice provisions and ISP obliga-
vided incentives for subscribers to do likewise would be tions upon being made aware of an alleged infringe-
liable for both direct and contributory infringement. 74 ment. An elaborate notice and take-down regime is set
out in the Act, including details regarding the content of
Legislative Reform & Increased Certainty: a notice. 85 There is also a further limitation of liability
The DMCA from any claims brought by subscribers for wrongful
termination of service against ISPs that remove or disableDespite the more reasonable approach to ISP lia-
access to infringing material in response to a notice ofbility outlined in Netcom and subsequent cases, com-
infringement. 86 So, unlike Netcom, which suggested thatmentators nonetheless remained concerned about the
a ‘‘colourable claim of fair use’’ might negate the ISP’sstatus of this issue in American law. The Netcom
‘‘knowledge’’ of infringement obligations, the DMCAapproach of limiting liability for direct and vicarious
obviates the need for the ISP to assess the merits of aninfringement while leaving open the possibility of con-
alleged infringement. The Act simply errs in favour oftributory infringement seemed to accord with the
having ISPs remove allegedly infringing material. 87 Ainability of ISPs to monitor all content but potential
copyright owner can also obtain a subpoena to compelability to control specified access. However, none of
an ISP to release the identity and location of an allegedthese District Court decisions was subjected to appellate
infringer. 88 Overall, the DMCA’s limitation of liabilityreview and Frena technically remained good law.75 In
scheme encourages ISPs to be ‘‘good citizens’’ and helpaddition to the possibility that Netcom could be over-
copyright owners stop infringement once it is brought toruled, the notice requirements and ISP obligations under
their attention. 89 Although copyright owners cannotthe contributory infringement issue remained vague. As
recover directly from ISPs, there is considerable incentiveProfessor Yen remarked: ‘‘Initial jousting over ISP lia-
for ISPs to block access to allegedly infringing materialbility has proven inconclusive. Although courts show an
and to assist owners in finding primary infringers. In thisunderstandable reluctance to hold ISPs liable for the
way, the DMCA enhances the enforceability of copyrightdeliberate behaviour of others, the few judicial decisions
online without placing an undue burden on ISPs.that exist are by no means conclusive’’. 76 These uncer-
tainties, coupled with a belief that Congress was better
situated to deal with the complex technological issues
and broad policy implications tied to this area of copy- The Canadian Position: Tariff 22right law, led many to conclude that legislation on the and Lingering Questions issue of ISP liability for online infringement was neces-
sary. 77 nlike the American experience, Canadian courts
Congress responded to these pressures in 1998 U have yet to directly confront the issue of ISP lia-
when it passed the DMCA. Title II of the Act includes bility for copyright infringement in relation to either its
detailed provisions regarding ISP liability. Although own activities or those of its subscribers. 90 Indeed, the
heavily criticized for its ‘‘cumbersome and disorganized only judicial consideration of the topic arose somewhat
structure’’, 78 the DMCA basically provides a statutory circuitously through the Copyright Board’s decision with
limitation of liability for ISPs with respect to both their respect to SOCAN’s proposed Tariff 22 and the Federal
own activities and those of their subscribers. To be eli- Court of Appeal’s subsequent judicial review of the
gible for the limitations, an ISP first must adopt and Board’s decision. 91 Filed pursuant to s. 67.1 of the Copy-
inform its subscribers of a policy to terminate accounts right Act, the proposed tariffs would have required ISPs
of repeat copyright infringers. 79 If this pre-condition is to pay royalties for the communication of musical works
met, the Act’s four ‘‘safe harbours’’ exempt an ISP from owned by SOCAN over digital networks such as the
liability for any infringement where it: (1) acts only as a Internet. In the course of its Phase I discussion of the
mere conduit for transmissions; 80 (2) performs system legal elements of the tariff proposal, the Copyright Board
caching functions; 81 (3) stores infringing material on its addressed several issues relating to Internet communica-

































































ISP Liability for Online Copyright Infringement 121
below suggests, even with the Federal Court of Appeal’s restricts its activities to that of an intermediary trans-
review of the Board’s decision and the recent granting of mitter would receive the benefit of the exemption:
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the fact
As long as its role in respect of any given transmission isthat ISP liability was only indirectly before the Board limited to providing the means necessary to allow data initi-
leaves substantial gaps in any assessment as to how Cana- ated by other persons to be transmitted over the Internet,
and as long as the ancillary services it provides fall short ofdian courts might approach ISP copyright liability. Ulti-
involving the act of communicating the work or authorizingmately, given these uncertainties, the proposed amend-
the communication, it should be allowed to claim thements to the Copyright Act remain necessary. exemption. 98
The Board suggested that to determine whether an
Direct Infringement ISP acts merely as a passive conduit or something more
requires examination of the function of the ISP in eachAlthough Internet transmissions and the activities of
transaction. Where, for example, an ISP itself posts con-ISPs might implicate several direct rights of copyright
tent, creates embedded links, or moderates newsgroups,owners, Tariff 22 holds that, at a minimum, Internet
it can no longer claim the exemption. 99 However, thetransmissions constitute communications to the public
Board indicated that an ISP would not be precludedby telecommunications and therefore potentially
from relying on the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemption simplyinfringe s. 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act. 92 More signifi-
because it provides caching services because a cache ‘‘iscantly for ISPs however, the Board found that the person
but an intrinsic element of the telecommunicationswho communicates a work by telecommunication is
system that is the Internet’’. 100 The Board consideredgenerally not the ISP but rather the individual who ini-
such procedures ‘‘ancillary to providing the means oftially posts the work:
telecommunication’’ and therefore still within theThe person who posts a work (usually the content provider)
exemption from liability under s. 2.4(1)(b). 101does so for the sole purpose that it be accessed by others.
Since Internet transmissions are communications, one
While the Federal Court of Appeal did not takeshould look at the source of the transmission to find out
who is responsible for it. Any communication of a work issue with the Board’s holdings that the person who
occurs because a person has taken all of the required steps to posts material communicates it to the public and that
make the work available for communication. The fact that ISPs generally meet the criteria of s. 2.4(1)(b), 102 thethis is achieved at the request of the recipient or through an majority found that the Board erred in deciding that ISPsagent neither adds to, nor detracts from the fact that the
continued to benefit from the common carrier exemp-content provider effects the communication. 93
tion even if they performed caching activities. Evans J.A.,The Board went even further to suggest that the with Linden J.A. concurring, adopted a strict definitionperson who initially posts the work to the Internet of the term ‘‘necessary’’ in s. 2.4(1)(b) and concluded thatremains liable for the communication to the public by an ISP provides the means of telecommunication neces-telecommunication infringement, even if the transmis- sary for another person to communicate only so far assion of the work originates from a cache or mirror server without the ISP’s activities the Internet would not in allwhere the ISP may have stored a temporary copy of the probability have been used as the medium of telecom-work. 94 According to the Board, because an ISP neither munication. 103 Accordingly, while storing infringinginitiates nor receives the transmission of information material as a host server is necessary, caching is not. 104along its system, an ISP cannot itself be said to be com- Evans J.A rejected the Board’s characterization of cachingmunicating to the public. as an intrinsic element of providing the means of tele-
While the focus on the person who initially posts communication:
material as the communicator seems sufficient to
In my opinion . . . the fact that the cache enhances the speedexclude ISPs from liability for infringing the s. 3(1)(f) of transmission and reduces the cost to the Internet access
right of copyright owners, the Board also held that the provider does not render the cache a practical necessity for
s. 2.4(1)(b) ‘‘common carrier’’ exemption applied to ISPs. communication. Desirable as these features may be, they do
not justify giving the word ‘‘necessary’’ a broader meaningThis section provides that ‘‘a person whose only act in
than it normally bears, especially if this would further eroderespect of the communication of a work . . . to the public
copyright holders’ right to be compensated for the use ofconsists of providing the means of telecommunication their works by others. 105
necessary for another person to so communicate the
work . . . does not communicate the work . . . to the Without evidence that Internet transmission is
public’’. 95 The section has historically applied to exempt made either so slow or expensive without ISP caching
from liability those service providers that function as a that it would become economically or practically unfea-
‘‘mere conduit’’ for the communications of infringing sible, the Court refused to accept that caching activities
materials by a primary infringer and exists to encourage are ‘‘necessary’’. Furthermore, the Court held that in
wide dissemination of works to the public. 96 However, selecting which material to cache and programming a
there was considerable uncertainty about whether the server to transmit from a cache when that material is
exemption would be extended to cover ISPs in requested, an ISP ceased to be ‘‘only’’ a passive trans-
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from a cache, an ISP itself infringes the owner’s right to acting as a ‘‘mere conduit’’ with respect to communica-
communicate to the public by telecommunication. tion. 112 The lack of guidance in this area leaves such
direct liability open to speculation.The majority’s approach to caching is an overly rigid
interpretation of the wording of the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemp- In Netcom and subsequent American cases, the
tion that contradicts Evans J.A.’s own suggestion that courts suggested that an ISP did not infringe an owner’s
‘‘where its language and underlying rationale permit, leg- exclusive right to reproduce the work simply because it
islation should be interpreted in a way that takes had made a digital copy of the work either in the course
account of technological developments’’. 107 Dissenting of transmitting a user’s message or temporarily caching a
only on this single point, Sharlow J.A. preferred to define site on its server. 113 Sookman argues that Canadian law
‘‘necessary’’ in a way that would give the common carrier should also follow this approach, suggesting that for an
exemption ‘‘enough flexibility to recognize incremental ISP ‘‘to be liable for infringement [of the reproduction
technological improvements’’. 108 Even if it is not strictly right] there must . . . be an element of causation by the
necessary to enable Internet communications, caching alleged infringer’’. 114 This however, goes against the tech-
enhances the speed and efficiency of transmissions and is nical reality that when a user simply browses a site or an
appropriately characterized as ancillary to Internet com- ISP caches a Web page, a digital copy — however tempo-
munications and within the protective scope of the rary or ephemeral — is made and the owner’s exclusive
s. 2.4(1) exemption. 109 Pre-Tariff 22 commentatory sup- right to reproduction is prima facie infringed. 115 It is
ported this broader approach of ‘‘necessary’’ and con- possible, and even likely according to the Information
tinued shelter of the s. 2.4(1) exemption despite an ISP’s Highway Advisory Committee, that the Copyright Act
caching activities. 110 As Sharlow J.A. suggests, to adopt the would therefore not permit the reproduction of works
more narrow definition ‘‘sets the bar too high’’ and erects for the purposes of caching. 116 Indeed, this interpretation
an impractical barrier preventing both ISPs and their seems almost to inevitably flow from Evans J.A. conclu-
subscribers from benefiting from the increased efficien- sion in Tariff 22 that in creating a cache, an ISP is no
cies available in what is essentially the automated process longer providing ‘‘only the means of telecommunication
of caching. necessary to communicate to the public’’. It is but a short
extension to suggest that caching is no longer providingTariff 22’s lengthy discussion of ISP liability in rela-
only the means of telecommunication precisely becausetion to the right to communicate to the public by tele-
it involves an infringement of the reproduction right.communication is significant both for the potential
direct infringements of ISPs that it forecloses and those And, as the Court suggested in Frena, the fact that
which it leaves open. On the one hand, the Board’s an ISP or user does not intend to make a copy is irrele-
categorization of Internet transmissions as a communica- vant. As reproduction is a direct right of the owner,
tion to the public by telecommunication excludes the ‘‘neither intention to infringe nor knowledge that the
possibility that in transmitting subscriber information acts constitute infringement is necessary to make out the
ISPs might infringe an owner’s right to perform or cause of action’’. 117 But this legal approach to ISP caching
deliver the work in public. Section 3(4) of the Copyright is clearly problematic. As Whyte D.J. noted in Netcom,
Act expressly provides that ‘‘for the purposes of subsec- such a result risks extending ISP liability for copyright
tion (1), the act of communicating the work to the infringement to virtually any infringing transmission
public by telecommunication does not constitute the act made on the Internet. 118 And, as Sharlow J.A. noted in
of performing or delivering the work in public . . . ’’. 111 dissent in Tariff 22, it also displays a technological inflex-
Potential ISP infringement of these rights can therefore ibility inconsistent with the practical realities of the
be safely discounted. Internet. 119
On the other hand, however, the detailed commen- The solution to this dilemma might be found in thetary Tariff 22 offers with respect to the ISP exemption concept of an implied licence. The Supreme Court hasfrom liability for infringing the right to communicate to suggested that an otherwise infringing use of a workthe public by telecommunications, leaves unsettled in might be permitted where there is a clear inference ofCanadian law the basic yet fundamentally important consent from the person holding the particular rightissue as to whether the activities of an ISP might infringe alleged to be infringed. 120 For some analysts, this impliedan owner’s exclusive right to reproduce a work. This is licence solves the problem of interminable liability forbecause as tariff proceedings, where a royalty could only the automatic copying that occurs during caching,be imposed if ISPs were found to infringe an owner’s browsing or linking:right to communicate to the public by telecommunica-
tion or an authorization of that right, the question of ISP The concept of implied licence is important for ISPs and
other operators with respect to caching and for users withliability for infringement generally was not fully in issue.
respect to browsing. If a copyright owner has permitted theSignificantly, the common carrier exemption only pro-
work to be placed on the Internet, it could be argued thattects an ISP from liability based on the communication the owner has implicitly consented to caching as a necessary
by telecommunication right and leaves open the possi- method of copying the work to permit the work to be
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However, as this passage suggests and the Court However, the focus on control leaves open the possibility
held in Bishop, 122 an implied licence can only exist that an ISP — which, unlike the vendor of a cassette-
where the copyright owner initially posts or authorizes deck or VCR, arguably continues to exercise control over
the posting of a work to the Internet. Consequently, a subscriber’s infringing activities by maintaining their
where the initial posting of the material is itself access connection or hosting their Web page — might
infringing, an implied licence will likely not be invoked be found to ‘‘authorize’’ that infringement.
to excuse the user’s or ISP’s temporary reproduction of The Board’s decision in Tariff 22 partially clarified
work during browsing or caching. Alternatively, a court how the concept of authorization might apply to ISPs.
might be persuaded to adopt the more flexible Netcom Although the Board held that a work is not communi-
approach and simply impart a knowledge requirement cated over the Internet when it is made available but
for direct liability. While such options are more reason- rather only when it is transmitted, it nonetheless held
able than the alternative of considering caching and that the communication of such a work is authorized
browsing infringements of the reproduction right, the when it is posted. 130 This means that the person who
position in Canadian law on this point remains ambig- makes the work available on the Web site not only
uous. communicates that work, but also authorizes its commu-
nication. The initial poster of the work places it online
Authorized Infringement for the sole purpose of having it communicated and with
In addition to the specific rights enumerated in full knowledge and intention that such communication
s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act, it is also an infringement to should occur and thus authorizes the communication. 131
authorize another person to perform any of the s. 3(1) The Board went on to expressly state that ISPs do not
activities without the consent of the owner. Authoriza- authorize the communication of a work:
tion is a separate and distinct right of the copyright Even knowledge by an ISP that its facilities may be
holder and, if infringed, constitutes an independent employed for infringing purposes does not make the ISP
liable for authorizing the infringement if it does not purportwrong in addition to the infringements of anyone who
to grant to the person committing the infringement aacts upon that authorization. 123 In addition, the s. 2.4(1)
licence or permission to infringe. An intermediary wouldexemption for common carriers does not extend to have to sanction, approve or countenance more than the
shield a party from liability for an infringement of the mere use of equipment that may be used for infringement.
authorization right. This raises the issue of whether — Moreover, an ISP is entitled to presume that its facilities will
be used in accordance with the law. 132quite apart from its potential liability for direct infringe-
ment discussed above — an ISP that allows subscribers According to the Board’s analysis, therefore, in addi-
access to infringing material or hosts a subscriber’s Web tion to technical issues concerning the extent of an ISP’s
page that contains infringing content can be said to control, ISPs appeared to be immune from allegations of
authorize the infringing reproduction, public display or infringement of the authorization right so long as they
communication by telecommunication of that material. refrained from purporting to grant subscribers permis-
Pre-Tariff 22 commentary predicted that this issue sion to infringe.
would be the most important legal concept involved in
The Federal Court of Appeal largely affirmed theidentifying liability in the Internet environment in Cana-
reasoning of the Board, but diverged slightly in cau-dian law.124
tioning that some conduct might in fact amount to
Fortunately for ISPs, the courts have narrowly inter- authorization by ISPs. Evans J.A. acknowledged that it is
preted the concept of ‘‘authorization’’ to require actions not feasible for ISPs to monitor and control in any sys-
that ‘‘sanction, approve or countenance infringement’’. 125 tematic way the content of material transmitted to sub-
Joyal J. recently explained that this means a party must scribers. He concluded that absent this control element,
do more than merely supply another party with equip- an ISP that merely provides access to subscribers could
ment that might be used for infringing activities. 126 To not be said to authorize a content poster’s infringing
authorize another party’s infringement, the purported communication to those end users. 133 Even for ISPs that
authorizer must have enough control over the infringer operate as host servers for subscribers’ sites from which
to prevent the infringement and behave in a way that infringing material is transmitted, where a greater degree
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that they of control over content might be present, the Court held
had approved or countenanced infringement. 127 Further- that ISPs do not implicitly authorize a communication
more, there is a presumption that use of equipment is of that infringing work:
authorized only so far as the activity for which it is to be
. . .[I]t seems counterintuitive to conclude that a person whoused is in accordance with the law.128 So, in an action supplies the means to enable another to communicate
brought by a record company against the manufacturer material thereby authorizes, as opposed, say, to facilitates, its
communication by that other person. The concept ofof double-cassette stereos that were advertised for their
‘‘authorizing’’ implies that the person who is alleged to haveability to copy recorded works, the House of Lords held
authorized has the right to give any requisite permission. 134that the defendant did not ‘‘authorize’’ any infringement
because it lacked control over the equipment once sold However, notwithstanding this conclusion, Evans
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communicate infringing material might be inferred if an to use its equipment for distribution of infringing mate-
ISP failed to remove infringing material on a hosted site rial may be considered to ‘‘aid and abet’’ that infringe-
after being advised of its presence on the server and ment and thus be found liable for indirect infringe-
given a reasonable opportunity to take it down.135 ment. 143
This cautionary note is problematic in that it runs The Tariff 22 decision does not expressly confront
counter to the reasoning both of the Board and the the issue of potential indirect liability of ISPs. However,
Federal Court of Appeal and adds considerable uncer- such an infringement remains possible. As with the
tainty to the concept of authorization. It is extremely authorization right, the benefit of the s. 2.4(1)(b) exemp-
difficult to see how the provision of notice to an ISP can tion does not extend to protect ISPs from claims of
suddenly bestow that ISP with the ‘‘right to give any secondary infringement under s. 27(4)(b). As suggested
requisite permission’’ that Evans J.A. states must be pre- above, Evans J.A.’s comments as to the effect of notice
sent to constitute authorization. In speculating on this with respect to an infringement of the authorization
point, the Court relied on obiter comments in a single right are arguably more appropriately considered in rela-
English case, 136 which pre-dated the House of Lords’ tion to this indirect infringement. Indeed, similar to
decision in Amstrad, 137 to the effect that a supplier’s Evans J.A., the Board appeared to have left open the
indifference as to the infringing use of its equipment possibility that once put on notice of a subscriber’s
may reach such a degree that authorization can be infringement, an ISP that fails to take action may be
inferred. But indifference, even in the face of notice and indirectly liable if it is deemed to be acting ‘‘in concert’’
a possible requirement to act to remove infringing mate- with the infringing subscriber. 144 However, like
rial, cannot create in an ISP the right to authorize Netcom’s brief discussion of contributory infringement,
another party’s infringement. As explained below, 138 the fact that neither the Board nor the Federal Court of
under Canadian copyright law the effect of notice and Appeal were required to address this specific issue leaves
the ISP’s consequent ‘‘knowledge’’ of subscriber infringe- several uncertainties. 145 There is no guidance as to the
ment is better considered under the head of indirect details of the content and degree of specificity required
infringement than authorization. for a notice to sufficiently bring a subscriber’s infringe-
ment to the ‘‘knowledge’’ of an ISP. Would a Canadian
court adopt the broad ‘‘more than mere allegation’’ yetIndirect Infringement 
less than ‘‘unequivocal proof’’ guidelines proposed inAlthough Canadian common law has not devel-
Netcom? As Hayes points out, the nature of an ISP’soped a distinct doctrine of ‘‘contributory infringement’’
obligations once put on notice of subscriber infringe-as exists in the United States, there is still the possibility
ment also remain vague. 146 Must an ISP simply requestthat ISPs in Canada could be held indirectly liable for
the subscriber to desist any infringing activity? Or, isthe infringing activities of a subscriber. This secondary
there an obligation to disable access? Although Netcomliability for infringement falls under the s. 27(4)(b) distri-
suggests the latter, higher duty is imposed under thebution right of copyright owners which restricts a party
American doctrine of contributory infringement, 147 andwith knowledge that material infringes from distributing
the Canadian position under indirect infringementthat material either for the purposes of trade or to such
remains uncertain.an extent that it prejudicially affects the owner. 139 Unlike
the direct infringement of the right to copy, right to
communicate to the public by telecommunication, or Proposals for Reform 
right of authorization, the knowledge of infringement is
The state of Canadian law regarding ISP liability fora key element for a finding of indirect liability. The
online infringement, whether arising out of its own activ-Courts have interpreted ‘‘knowledge’’ in this context to
ities or those of its subscribers, remains unresolved.mean ‘‘notice of facts such as would suggest to a reason-
Although the Tariff 22 decision suggests that ISPs willable [person] that a breach of the copyright law was
not be held to infringe the right to communicate to thebeing committed’’. 140 As the Federal Court explained in
public by telecommunication (so long as they refrainApple Computer, knowledge of infringement will
from caching activities) or to have authorized such com-impose certain obligations on a party that deals with
munication, the decision fails to clarify whether an ISPinfringing material:
might infringe the reproduction right. It also remainsOnce an individual has either actual or imputed knowledge
unclear what effect notice of infringement would havethat the work dealt with may be infringing copyright, the
individual has an obligation to make enquiries to ensure on potential ISP liability. Furthermore, there is the added
that the work does not infringe copyright. 141 concern that obiter comments of Evans J.A. appear to
Extending these obligations to the context of the leave open the possibility that even if ISPs are not sub-
Internet suggests that if an ISP fails to take reasonable jected to any tariff that is ultimately established, they
steps to prevent continuation of a particular subscriber’s may nonetheless still find themselves as defendants in an
infringing activities once put on notice of such infringe- infringement action. 148 And, of course, the fact that the
ment, the ISP itself may be liable for indirect infringe- decision is currently under review before the Supreme
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direction of the law in this area. In addition to these Although an ISP is still entitled to presume that its
concerns, there is also a sense that courts are ill equipped equipment will be used for lawful purposes, that pre-
to resolve the highly technical and broad policy issues sumption can be rebutted if a copyright owner notifies
raised by questions of ISP liability. 149 These legal and an ISP that it is storing infringing material (as under the
policy concerns suggest that amendments to the Copy- DMCA). Accordingly, an ISP would become statutorily
right Act are required to clarify the state of Canadian law liable if it failed to block access to a subscriber’s allegedly
surrounding ISP liability for copyright infringement. infringing material or desist with its own infringing
caching activities within a specified time after receivingThe Consultation Paper directly addresses this per-
proper notice from the rights holder. 154 This clarifies theceived need for legislative action. Acknowledging that it
uncertainty surrounding ‘‘authorization’’ and ‘‘indirectis not technically feasible for ISPs to monitor the content
infringement’’ under s. 27(4) in that it requires ISPs toof all transmissions or subscriber material, 150 and
exercise their control over hosting and caching activitiesinsisting that clear and fair rules for ISP liability are
once notified. 155imperative for the growth of the technology sector in
Third and finally, the amendments would limit theCanada, the Consultation Paper proposes three areas for
liability of ISPs that might arise out of any subscriberreform to the Copyright Act regarding ISP liability.
claim against an ISP for its compliance with the noticeAlthough the discussion is framed in relatively broad
and take-down process. An ISP acting in ‘‘good faith’’terms, these proposals appear to be modelled on the
that blocks access to a specified site upon receipt ofAmerican approach in the DMCA. First, the amend-
proper notice would not be liable for any harm sufferedments would provide ISPs with a statutory limitation of
by its client or other third party if the alleged infringe-liability for copyright infringement arising out of its own
ment is not in fact substantiated. 156 Again, as under theactivities or those of its subscribers. The Consultation
American DMCA process, this removes the necessity forPaper suggests:
an ISP to assess whether the claimant in fact holds theAn ISP would not be liable for copyright infringement when
rights allegedly infringed and to determine whether theits facilities are used by a third party (including its clients)
for disseminating copyright-protected material, whether this alleged infringer’s activities might be validly authorized
dissemination is understood as a communication to the or fall within one of the fair dealing exemptions. The ISP
public (i.e. through a network transmission process) or need only comply with the requirement to block access;reproduction (e.g. for the purposes of caching or web site
there is no need to assess the validity of the infringementhosting). Similarly, the ISP would not be liable for reproduc-
tions of copyrighted materials in the form of caches that claim.
facilitate the communications process where the original or
initial communication is authorized. 151
This provision would, therefore, overrule the Fed- Assessing the impact of proposederal Court of Appeal’s decision to allow ISPs and their
reforms subscribers the benefit of caching. This would also
obviate the need to stretch the implied licence doctrine t is not enough to simply note that the government’s
to cover those situations where it would not apply I proposed reforms appropriately respond to the tech-
because the original material is not posted with authori- nical difficulties surrounding ISP liability and provide
zation of the owner. The amendments would exempt an some much needed clarity and predictability in this area
ISP’s automatic file copying from infringing the owner’s of the law. It is also vital that the impact of these reforms
reproduction right. on the nature of copyright law itself — and the social
Second, a complaint driven notice and take-down and economic reasons for which it purportedly exists —
process similar to that in the DMCA would be incorpo- be carefully considered. Professor Vaver encourages this
rated into the Copyright Act to deal with hosting or line of inquiry: ‘‘ . . . [I]f the allocation of these property
caching of infringing material. Although any such pro- rights is simply a means to an end . . . then one must ask
cess would be subject to contractual arrangements made if the means is the most effective way to that end’’. 157 Of
between particular ISPs and rights holders, it would sup- course, any such assessment of the effectiveness of the
plant the voluntary CAIP code of conduct that ISPs are means — that is, the proposed reforms — will depend
currently encouraged to observe in their relationships on which ‘‘end’’ copyright law is deemed to serve. In this
with subscribers. 152 As the Consultation Paper explains, respect, two justifications are posited for the existence of
this process would obligate ISPs to block access to copyright law — one based on natural rights, and the
infringing material posted by subscribers or to restrain other on utilitarian theory. While the results of the pro-
their own caching activities once notice is received: posed limitation of ISP liability might prove disap-
pointing from the former perspective, the effects of theUnder a notice and take-down system, an intermediary is
shielded from copyright liability unless, after having proposed measures suggest that the fundamental basis of
received notice of infringing material on its facilities, it fails Canadian copyright law is shifting more in favour of the
to take requisite steps to address the situation. Notice creates latter approach. However, even if the proposed limita-the impetus for the ISP to remove the offending material by
tion of ISP liability suggests considerable concern withexposing the ISP to the risk of (greater) liability for failure to
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not clear that the proposed amendments as they cur- misses the ‘‘moral’’ justification of copyright law because
rently stand achieve an entirely acceptable balance. In its underlying rationale is simply inconsistent with
particular, revisions to the notice and take-down scheme existing statutory regimes:
might be required. But these arguments fail to make the case . . . The logic
flowing from a concept of natural rights, that ideas should
be protected in perpetuity and throughout the world, has
never been accepted by even the most ardent promoters of aNatural Rights Theory: Primacy to
strict intellectual property regime. 163Protecting Intellectual Property 
Casting copyright law as a natural right ignores theThe natural rights justification for copyright law is
fact that copyright is purely a creation of statute andbased on John Locke’s theory of property and emerged
represents a deliberate government intervention in thein support of intellectual property during the French
market for creating and distributing artistic works. TheRevolution. 158 The central premise is that copyright is
scope of this intervention is therefore a question of socialmerely an extension of the basic human right to the
and economic policy, not interference with ‘‘naturalproduct of one’s own labour. If physical labour yields a
rights’’. 164 In addition to these critiques, a focus on theright to tangible property, the intellectual labour
natural rights of individual creators ignores the contribu-involved in creating an artistic work likewise yields a
tions of previous creators and the significance of theright to intangible property. Earlier proposals for amend-
public domain in generating and shaping ideas. 165ments to the Copyright Act clearly embraced this abso-
Authors do not create works entirely within the confineslute property perspective on the purpose of copyright.
of their own individual minds but are fundamentallyFor example, the 1985 report A Charter of Rights for
dependent upon the ideas and forms of expression thatCreators stated: ‘‘The Sub-Committee [on the Revision
have preceded their own creations. Consequently, it mayof Copyright] . . . takes the opportunity to assert that
be inappropriate to focus solely on the protections‘ownership is ownership is ownership’. The copyright
afforded rights holders in assessing the effects of theowner owns the intellectual works in the same sense as a
proposed reforms.landowner owns land’’. 159 In addition to this property-
based argument, two other ideas are frequently cited to
buttress the natural rights justification for copyright: first, Utilitarian Theory: Balancing Creative
authors have a moral right to have their creations pro- Incentive with Public Access 
tected as an extension of their person; and second,
Given these shortcomings of the natural rights per-authors have a right to reward for making a valued con-
spective, a more utilitarian explanation for copyright lawtribution to society. 160
is frequently embraced today and may serve as a better
If one relies upon the natural rights justification for standard against which to measure the proposed amend-
copyright law, the effects of the proposed amendments ments. Rather than focus on the rights of authors, this
to the Copyright Act might be deemed to fall short of law and economics-based approach views copyright law
fulfilling the underlying purpose of the statute. Any stat- as performing a sort of public intellectual wealth max-
utory limitation on the liability of ISPs would, according imization function. 166 Seen in this way, the purpose of
to this perspective, represent a degradation of the pro- copyright law is to balance the competing interests of
tected rights of a copyright owner and thereby fail to creators to profit from their works and the public to
keep the Act up to pace with the digital environment. access those works. 167 The law is essentially a ‘‘bargain’’
This would be particularly vexing where new technolo- between the public and copyright holders that is ulti-
gies already threaten the scope of protection afforded to mately aimed at the public benefit derived from confer-
copyright owners. Indeed, this is the substance of objec- ring rights on authors. 168 As Fewer explains:
tions to the proposed amendments from collective rights
Under utilitarian analysis, copyright is justified as an incen-holders such as SOCAN and the CRIA, which argue that tive system, granting exclusive rights to authors for limited
a limitation of liability for any party infringes an artist’s periods of time to encourage the production of intellectual
rights to full compensation for use of their works. 161 works. Such rights are granted in the public interest to
maximize the dissemination of intellectual goods in theHere, with an exclusive focus on the rights of the owner
marketplace. If authors were not guaranteed the chance toto protection, the effects of a proposed limitation of lia-
exploit their intellectual works, the danger would exist thatbility for ISPs might be considered an inappropriate intellectual works would be underproduced — through a
direction for copyright law or an indication that it has lack of incentives for producers to invest time, money and
effort in intellectual works. 169resigned itself to technological defeat.
However, the use of ‘‘natural rights’’ as the ‘‘end’’ by Of course, the converse danger is also true: if the
which to assess the ‘‘means’’ of the proposed amend- incentives are too high, the result is an inefficient distri-
ments does not stand up to scrutiny. Despite its appeal in bution of works that ultimately goes to benefit rights
Western societies, where ‘‘property’’ rights are easily holders at the expense of restricting public access. If one
understood and tend to be strongly protected, 162 the adopts this utilitarian perspective, ‘‘the richness and
justification of copyright law as a natural right of authors vibrancy of the public domain can be regarded . . . as a
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In the United States, the balancing objective of cop- expressly endorses a utilitarian justification of copyright
yright law is constitutionally entrenched and dominates law.
judicial thinking on the topic. 171 In Canada, where the Even if judicial support for conceptualizing copy-
grant of constitutional authority over copyright does not right law as a balancing act between private and public
hint as to its rationale or how it is to be exercised, 172 interests remains divided, there is no doubt that this
there is nonetheless considerable support for adopting justification underlies the current government’s policy to
the utilitarian justification. The fact that the first English reform the Copyright Act. The Framework for Copyright
copyright statute was entitled A Bill for the Encourage- Reform repeatedly emphasizes the importance of bal-
ment of Learning has been taken as support for the ance in any proposals for reform: ‘‘It is imperative that
public benefit aspect of copyright law.173 More signifi- we ensure an appropriate balance between copyright
cantly, the limited term of copyright protections, protection and access to works in the new technological
common carrier exception, fair-dealing exemptions, and environment’’. 181 The Consultation Paper similarly
compulsory licensing schemes contained within the focuses on the dual function of the statute: ‘‘The Copy-
Copyright Act itself suggest that the rights of creators are right Act serves to recognize, promote and protect intel-
to be balanced against the public interest in accessing lectual expression, as well as to encourage and enable
works. access to and dissemination of such expression’’. 182
Taken together, the documents clearly aim to ensureDespite these features that point towards a utilita-
that amendments to the Copyright Act achieve a balancerian approach to copyright law, until recently there had
between creators and the public that ensures the use ofbeen relatively little express judicial pronouncement on
digital technology and the Internet as a forum for boththe purpose of copyright law. Indeed, writing only five
artistic expression and public communication. 183years ago, Fewer relied in part on the following ex cath-
edra comments of McLachlin J. (as she then was) to
support an argument in favour of the utilitarian
approach to copyright law: Limited ISP Liability with Notice and
Take-Down — An Acceptable Balance? We must stop thinking of intellectual property as an abso-
lute and start thinking of it as a function — as a process,
If, then, one relies upon this utilitarian function aswhich, if it is to be successful, must meet diverse aims: the
the copyright ‘‘end’’ according to which the proposedassurance of a fair reward to creators and inventors and the
encouragement of research and creativity, on the one hand; amendments should be assessed, it appears that the
and, on the other hand, the widest possible dissemination of effects of the proposed amendments may indeed help
the ideas and products of which the world, and all the copyright law find a new balance in the digital age. Theindividuals in it, have such great need. 174
limitation of liability for ISPs, coupled with a notice and
The Federal Court of Appeal has, in the past, simi- take-down process, approximates a beneficial compro-
larly emphasized the need to balance interests. In mise between the interests of public access and owner
reviewing a decision of the Copyright Board, Letourneau protection. On one hand, the protections for ISPs pro-
J.A. remarked that ‘‘the Board properly understood its vide a predictable legal framework that promotes tech-
function when it stated that it had to regulate the bal- nological investment and a competitive ISP sector, which
ance of market power between copyright owners and in turn ultimately promise to increase the public’s ability
users’’. 175 to access the vast array of content available on the
Internet. 184 On the other hand, ISPs do not get anHowever, these earlier hints that the Courts might
unqualified exemption from liability. The notice andhave favoured a utilitarian justification for copyright
take-down process provides an incentive for ISPs to helpappear to have been clearly endorsed by the Supreme
owners stop online copyright infringement and therebyCourt of Canada in its recent Théberge v. Galerie d’Art
secures added protection for rights holders in the digitaldu Petit Champlain inc. decision. 176 Speaking for a 4–3
environment. 185 While the notice and take-down systemmajority, Binnie J. accepts that copyright law is ‘‘a bal-
places the burden of monitoring infringement upon theance between promoting the public interest in the
owner, it nonetheless provides a quick and inexpensiveencouragement and dissemination of work of the arts
mechanism to have infringing material removed. 186and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the cre-
Thus, in its attempt to promote access while simultane-ator’’. 177 Drawing on economic terminology, he suggests
ously preserving the incentive to create, the proposedthat this objective is achieved neither by overcompen-
amendments appear to move copyright law towards asating nor undercompensating artists, but rather requires
suitable balance for the digital age.an optimally efficient level of compensation. 178 Binnie J.
adds the cautionary note that extending rights holders’ Despite this appearance of balance, however, a brief
control over access too far threatens the long-term inter- caution about the effect of the notice and take-down
ests of society as a whole and creates improper impedi- process deserves attention. While the proposed process
ments to the use of creative material. 179 Here then, not- does seem to weigh the interests of both ISPs and copy-
withstanding the apparently divergent views of the three right owners, it appears to neglect the interests of alleged
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abuse. 187 The obligation of ISPs to remove allegedly a relatively trifling concern, especially when viewed
infringing material once notice is received, coupled with against the massive potential for online infringement.
the limitation of liability for an ISP who acts in ‘‘good Surely, some might argue, a process that is biased slightly
faith’’ to block access to allegedly infringing material, in favour of rights holders accords with the reality of
creates an environment ripe for the ‘‘overaggressive widespread infringement and enforcement difficulties
enforcement of copyright against subscribers who have experienced online. Indeed, such arguments might even
in fact committed no infringement’’. 188 By encouraging be acceptable if the limitation of ISP liability is viewed in
ISPs to indiscriminately remove or block access to sub- isolation from the other amendments proposed in the
scriber material in order to receive the limitation of lia- Consultation Paper. However, if these other amend-
bility protection, the notice and take-down process is too ments are also considered — and in particular the con-
heavily skewed in favour of rights owners. 189 Indeed, the templated restrictions on the use, manufacture and trade
requirement that an ISP block access upon receipt of of devices that facilitate circumvention of technological
notice creates a presumption that the subscriber’s activi- measures intended to protect copyright works193 — con-
ties are infringing. The onus falls on the alleged infringer cerns about inordinate control resting in the hands of
to then bring an action to prove that its activities are not private rights holders become more justified. Similar
infringing in order to have its material reposted. This anti-circumvention provisions contained in the DMCA
runs counter to the normal burden of proof that rests have been thoroughly criticized for upsetting copyright’s
upon an owner to prove infringement before a court will balance because they risk surrendering all control over
grant an injunction or other remedy. As Yen suggests, access to works to the rights holders. 194 Indeed, the Con-
this particular form of notice and take-down process ‘‘is sultation Paper acknowledges this risk and, rather than
tantamount to awarding the content provider a tempo- forward concrete proposals in this area, merely invites
rary restraining order and preliminary injunction ‘‘dialogue’’ from interested stakeholders on a range of
without any hearing before a court or the posting of a options. 195 Similar attention to the manner in which the
bond’’. 190 copyright balance might be upset should be devoted to
the design of the notice and take-down regime.The proposed notice and take-down procedure
should be revised to eliminate its potential use as a
means to arbitrarily block access to non-infringing mate-
rial. At the very least, a counter-notification should be Conclusion 
included that provides alleged infringers an opportunity
to rebut the allegations against them. Or, as the Cana- rofessor Lunney suggests: ‘‘As we begin a new mil-
dian Association of Internet Providers recommends, the P lennium, we face a choice both as to how, and more
government should adopt a ‘‘notice and notice’’ system importantly why, we protect creative works’’. 196 The
rather than the proposed notice and take-down process. issue of ISP liability for online copyright infringement
Under this alternative, rather than requiring an ISP to forces the courts, legislators and society generally to con-
disable or block access to a subscriber’s infringing mate- front these questions. The technological phenomena of
rial immediately obtaining a notice from the purported digitization and the Internet present unparalleled chal-
copyright owner, the ISP instead forwards the notice to lenges to whether and how copyright law can protect
its subscriber. If the alleged infringer does not voluntarily artistic works. As the conduits that make these technolo-
remove its material, the ISP releases the subscriber’s iden- gies accessible to the public, ISPs have figured largely in
tity to the purported rights holder who can then apply to this debate and the courts have struggled with how to
the court for an order requiring the ISP to disable access articulate their responsibilities.
to the material. 191 Such a scheme has the advantage that Analysis of the evolutionary treatment of ISP lia-
decisions concerning the illegality of a subscriber’s bility in American law, together with examination of the
actions and orders for enforcement rest with a court of current uncertain status of Canadian jurisprudence in
law and not under the private purview of purported this area, confirms that the government’s proposed
rights holders. Indeed, the federal government has amendments to the Copyright Act to limit the liability of
already incorporated such a judicially-ordered take-down ISPs are necessary to provide predictability in this area
scheme in relation to online child pornography. 192 If this and, perhaps more importantly, to ensure that copyright
more precautionary approach is deemed appropriate in law continues as a technically reasonable mechanism for
the context of the arguably more socially-condemnable protecting creative works. At the same time, these
posting of child pornography, certainly similar safeguards amendments also implicitly respond to the question of
should be afforded to alleged copyright infringers. Other- why copyright law exists, and whether it can retain any
wise, enforcement of this area of the law will effectively social legitimacy in the new digital setting. In imple-
devolve to private rights holders, a result inconsistent menting broad limitations of liability for ISPs while
with the need to balance private interest and public imposing a notice and take-down process that encour-
access in copyright law. ages ISPs to help rights holders police infringement
This cautionary note over the potential impact of where it is feasible to do so, the proposed amendments
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public interests. The amendments effectively address take-down process and a continued need to evaluate
both the need to provide an incentive for creators to use whether and how copyright law can maintain its bal-
the Internet through adequate copyright protections and ancing function within a rapidly changing environment,
the imperative to promote public access to works the statutory limitation of liability for ISPs is an appro-
through an expanding global network. Notwithstanding priate first-step in adapting the Copyright Act to deal
some required revisions to the details of the notice and with digital technologies.
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101 Ibid., at 452. liable for infringing the s. 27(4)(b) distribution right. See R. v. M.(J.P.)
(1996), 67 C.P.R. (3d) 152 (N.S.C.A.).102 Tariff 22 (FCA), supra note 15 at paras. 26-27. SOCAN did not challenge
the Board’s conclusion that a work transmitted on the Internet is com- 143 Sookman, supra note 32 at 3-274.1. Sookman here must be referring to
municated by telecommunication, nor that the person who communi- the obiter comments of Reed J. in Apple Computer, supra note 123 at
cates such a work is the person who initially posts it. 226 that ‘‘aiding and abetting infringement could in certain circum-
stances be sufficient to constitute infringement in itself’’.103 Ibid., at para. 132.
144 Tariff 22 (CB), supra note 15 at 442.104 Ibid., at paras. 133-134.
145 Evans J.A. expressly acknowledged that since SOCAN did not seek to105 Ibid., at para. 135.
hold ISPs liable to pay royalties on the limited basis of a failure to act106 Ibid., at paras. 138-139 and 142. once notified a thorough analysis of this issue was not required before
107 Ibid., at para. 122. the Board or on review. See Tariff 22 (FCA), supra note 15 at para. 160.
108 Ibid., at para. 197. 146 Hayes et al., supra note 7 at 22.
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148 See Tariff 22 (FCA), supra note 15 at para. 86 and 90. In discussing the 172 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(23) reprinted in
appropriate standard of review of the Board’s decision, Evans J.A. sug- R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
gests at para. 90: ‘‘ . . .[T]he impact of the Board’s decision on the parties’ 173 Ruston, supra note 2 at 321. The Statute of Anne (815) 8 Ann, c. 19 was
legal rights is limited. For example, a decision of the Board that a passed in 1710 and ended the monopoly of the Stationer’s Guild over
participant is not liable to pay a royalty, because its conduct is non- publishing.
infringing, does not have a determinative impact on the legal rights of
174 ‘‘Intellectual Property – What’s it all about?’’ (Address to the NationalSOCAN and its members. For example, subject to the exercise of a
Judicial course Intellectual Property: Trademark Law, 19 and 20court’s discretion to apply the doctrine of estoppel . . . a copyright owner
November 1992), cited in Fewer, supra note 158 at 193.may still sue for infringement, despite a determination by the Board in
royalty tariff proceedings that the defendant has not engaged in an 175 Canadian Association of Broadcasters v. Society of Composers, Authors
activity that is an exclusive right of a copyright owner’’. The doctrine of and Music Publishers of Canada (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 190 at 196.
issue estoppel has been most recently considered in Danyluk v. Ains- Letourneau JA added: ‘‘ . . . [I]t is no more the Board’s mandate to protect
worth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460 and is subject to a similar consumers to the detriment of copyright owners than it is to protect
sort of contextual analysis as is involved in the ‘‘pragmatic and func- monopolies to the detriment of consumers’’.
tional test’’ used to determine the standard of review for administrative 176 [2002] S.C.J. No. 32.decisions. The effect of the Board’s finding in tariff proceedings that ISPs
are not liable of infringement, even if ultimately upheld before the 177 Ibid., at para. 30. The Federal Court of Appeal approved of this statement
Supreme Court of Canada, remain unclear. in Tariff 22 (FCA), supra note 15 at para. 119 and relied on it as a basis
for rejecting SOCAN’s argument that the s. 2.4(1) common carrier149 Kaplan, L.A. ‘‘Resolving Tensions Between Copyrights and the Internet’’
exemption should be narrowly construed.(Keynote Address at Beyond Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright
on the Internet Symposium, American University School of Law, Wash- 178 Ibid., at para. 31.
ington D.C., 16 November 2000) (2000-01) 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 409 at 422. 179 Ibid., at para. 32.150 Although it does not discuss this issue at length, the Consultation Paper 180 See paras. 112-116. It is noteworthy that the three dissenting judgesrelies upon the more detailed technical study outlined in Canada, Regu-
included all three of the Court’s then sitting Quebec justices: Gonthier,lation of the Internet: A Technological Perspective(Ottawa: Ministry of
L’Heureux-Dubé and Lebel JJ. In the dissent, Gonthier J. emphasizesSupply and Services, 1999), online: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/
that Canada’s copyright legislation has its historic roots both in thesf/005082_e.pdf (last accessed: 30 April 2003).
English legislation and that of continental civil law nations including151 Consultation Paper, supra note 8 at 36. France. Although not expressly disagreeing with Binnie J.’s characteriza-
tion of copyright law, Gonthier J. does seem to suggest an approach that152 CAIP, online: http://www.caip.ca/issues/selfreg/code-of-conduct/
grants greater protection to the ownership rights of creators than thecode.htm (last accessed: 30 April 2003).
majority would contemplate.153 Consultation Paper, supra note 8 at 34-35.
181 Supra note 1.154 Ibid., at 36-37.
182 Supra note 8 at 4.155 See above, Part IV(ii) and (iii).
183 Bate, supra note 16 at 35.156 Consultation Paper, supra note 8 at 37.
184 Halpern, supra note 32 at 407; Murai, supra note 51 at 312.157 D. Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes’’ (1990)
69 Can. Bar Rev. 98 at 101 [Vaver, ‘‘Myths and Paradoxes’’]. 185 Skelton, supra note 35 at 311; Murai, supra note 51 at 314.
158 Vaver, Copyright Law, supra note 16 at 3. See also D. Fewer, ‘‘Constitu- 186 Yen, supra note 45 at 1887. The Consultation Paper (supra note 8) cites
tionalizing Copyright’’ (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 175 at 187; Rushton, this benefit as well.
supra note 2 at 319-321. 187 Ibid., This argument is the substance of Yen’s critique of the DMCA.159 Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright, Standing Committee on Although the Consultation Paper seems to have widely canvassed the
Communications and Culture, A Charter of Rights for Creators academic literature to ensure that its proposals at least consider the
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) at 9. academic concerns raised about the DMCA, it is notable for its failure to
address this issue. The DMCA, supra note 5, §512(g)(2) and (3) at least160 Rushton, supra note 2 at 319.
contains a counter-notification process, even if this is not up to Yen’s161 SOCAN, supra note 44 at 7.
approval.162 Vaver, ‘‘Myths and Paradoxes’’, supra note 157 at 102. 188 Yen, supra note 45 at 1891.163 Ibid., at 99-100. 189 Ibid., at 1888.164 M. Ryan, ‘‘Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for
190 Ibid., at 1889.Copyright in a Digital World’’ (2000) 79 Oregon L. Rev. 647 at 688.
191 CAIP, supra note 47 at 2.165 Fewer, supra note 158 at 188.
192 See Bill C-15A, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Amend166 Ruston, supra note 2 at 321.
other Acts, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001, cl. 7 (assented to 4 June 2002,167 Vaver, Copyright Law, supra note 16 at 9 and 14. For more discussion of
S.C. 2002, c. 13). The provisions are now contained in s. 164.1 of thethis theoretical approach to copyright law, particularly with respect to
Criminal Code.the U.S. Constitution, see J. Sheets, ‘‘Copyright Misused: The Impact of
the DMCA Anti-Circumvention Measures on Fair and Innovative Mar- 193 See Consultation Paper, supra note 8 at 20–25.
kets’’ (2000-01) 23 Hastings Comm/Ent. L.J. 1 at 2-4 and 8-13; Ryan, 194 This topic has received considerable attention in the American literature
supra note 164 at 649–660; M. Gimbel, ‘‘Some Thoughts on the Implica- and the Consultation Paper clearly acknowledges the dangers of anti-
tions of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law’’ (1998) 50 Stan. L. circumvention measures for upsetting the balance within copyright.
Rev. 1671 at 1680-81; and S.E. Weil, ‘‘Cloning and Copyright’’ (2001) 19 This issue is closely linked to the proposal to limit ISP liability as such
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 137 at 144. limitations are often in part justified by noting (hoping?) that owners are
168 R. Stallman, ‘‘Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail’’ (1996) better situated to develop technological solutions like encryption and
75 Oregon L. Rev. 291 at 293; J. Litman, ‘‘Revising Copyright Law for watermarking than are ISPs. The issue is only touched on here to
the Information Age’’ (1996) 75 Oregon L. Rev. 19 at 31. highlight the delicate balancing act involved in copyright reform. For
detailed discussion of the potential for anti-circumvention measures to169 Fewer, supra note 158 at 189.
upset the balance within copyright law, see Weil, supra note 167; Sheets,170 Ibid., at 203. supra note 167; Lunney, supra note 33; Gimbel, supra note 167; Ryan,
171 U.S. Const., art. I, §8 states: ‘‘The Congress shall have the power . . . To supra note 164; and Stallman, supra note 168. But see Ginsburg, ‘‘Copy-
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited right and Control’’ supra note 28 for a contrary opinion on the effect of
Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to Their Respective the DMCA’s anti-circumvention measures. Professor Ginsburg argues
Writings and Discoveries’’. Gimbel, supra note 167 at 1680 notes that that such protections will enable individual artists to publish and dis-
the express words ‘‘promote the progress’’ have been consistently inter- tribute their works independently, thus making them less dependent on
preted to mean that the grant of power is to be exercised for the public collective bodies or corporations to control the dissemination of their
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195 Consultation Paper, supra note 8 at 23-25. A ‘‘spectrum’’ of options is more extensive approach. See §1201 (a)(1)(A) and §1201(a)(1)(e)(2)(A)
forwarded for dialogue, ranging from restriction on specific actions of through (C).
circumvention at one end to more extensive prohibitions on possession,
import, sale and trade of circumvention devices. The DMCA adopts the 196 Lunney, supra note 33 at 998.
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